NOTE: This material is included here to show some of the requirements and arguments of the World Bank. I do not agree with most of them which are simply a rationale created to support the policies of the Bank. It is not an independent assessment of pros and cons of their policies, nor of the realities of what happens in practice.
Natural monopolies such as water utilities require economic regulation: a visible hand to substitute for the lack of market forces and ensure that the service provider does not abuse its monopolistic position. This approach is not easy to achieve in practice. Whether or not the government owns the utility, there is always a strong asymmetry of information between regula- tor and operator. Private operators can abuse their monopoly position to extract undue and excessive profits. Public water utilities can be captured by special interests, resulting in overstaffing, perks for political appointees, sloppy work and procurement practices, and lack of client orientation.
Water PPPs Are Not Necessarily More Difficult to Regulate
Than Public Utilities
Concerns about the difficulty of regulating private operators, in the chal- lenging context of developing countries, have been one of the major argu- ments against PPPs for urban water utilities. A regulator can, indeed, be captured by a private operator, which has strong financial interests at stake. Water PPPs are complex contracts and, in many cases, local governments with little experience in complex transactions face powerful multination- als. However, one might also observe that at least private operators operate under a framework that fosters accountability. A detailed contract spells out performance targets and mandates regular reporting. Methods for setting tariffs are stated in regulations and/or contracts, with usually much greater transparency than before. Private operators can be fined for noncompliance and can even have their contracts cancelled. Finally, PPPs tend to receive intense scrutiny from civil society—much more, in fact, than poorly per- forming public utilities.
Regulation of Water PPPs
Natural monopolies such as water utilities require economic regulation: a visible hand to substitute for the lack of market forces and ensure that the service provider does not abuse its monopolistic position. This approach is not easy to achieve in practice. Whether or not the government owns the utility, there is always a strong asymmetry of information between regula- tor and operator. Private operators can abuse their monopoly position to extract undue and excessive profits. Public water utilities can be captured by special interests, resulting in overstaffing, perks for political appointees, sloppy work and procurement practices, and lack of client orientation.
Water PPPs Are Not Necessarily More Difficult to Regulate
Than Public Utilities
Concerns about the difficulty of regulating private operators, in the chal- lenging context of developing countries, have been one of the major argu- ments against PPPs for urban water utilities. A regulator can, indeed, be captured by a private operator, which has strong financial interests at stake. Water PPPs are complex contracts and, in many cases, local governments with little experience in complex transactions face powerful multination- als. However, one might also observe that at least private operators operate under a framework that fosters accountability. A detailed contract spells out performance targets and mandates regular reporting. Methods for setting tariffs are stated in regulations and/or contracts, with usually much greater transparency than before. Private operators can be fined for noncompliance and can even have their contracts cancelled. Finally, PPPs tend to receive intense scrutiny from civil society—much more, in fact, than poorly per- forming public utilities.
Various Options Are Available for a Viable Regulatory System
The regulatory frameworks under which water PPPs operate in the develop- ing world fall into two broad categories. In some countries, the focus has been on regulation by contracts, with all elements detailed in the contract
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Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities
and a dedicated team assigned to supervise its execution on the govern- ment’s behalf. In others, the focus has been on the establishment of a broad legal and regulatory framework for the sector, usually accompanied by the creation of a regulatory agency with various degrees of discretionary power. In practice, the difference between these two approaches is not always obvi- ous, and assessing how well they have worked would go beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, this review of PPP performance highlights the following observations:
Clear and detailed contracts are important, whether they are at the core or just one element of regulation. The most recent literature (Ehrhardt and others 2007), as well as this review, shows that the use of contracts as the main point of reference for holding private operators accountable has worked well in places as diverse as Western Africa, Macao (China), Colom- bia, the Czech Republic, and Morocco.
Anchoring the regulation of water PPPs in a comprehensive regulatory framework, in which contracts are present but the main tools are the laws and regulations, has had more mixed results, especially where newly created regulatory agencies were granted significant discretionary power. In Chile, the regulatory arrangement has worked well, but the regulator had been in place for a long time before the transfer to the private sector and was, by then, a respected and credible player. In many other places, the establish- ment of credible regulatory agencies has proved challenging, which eventu- ally affected the implementation of many contracts.
The difficulties encountered with regulatory agencies are not themselves surprising: building a whole regulatory framework takes time and the pro- cess can be easily derailed. In this context, processing a single contract to address a well-identified problem may be simpler. Still, establishing a strong framework might be worth the effort, because once a framework is in place, it provides a clear and standardized point of reference that reduces the dis- cretion that can be exercised by parties negotiating individual contracts or their adjustments. Ultimately, the right choice of whether to focus on the contract or on the framework must depend on the specifics of the country, including, among other things, the type of legal and regulatory framework (if any) that governs its water supply and sanitation sector, the current level of institutional capacity within government, and the urgency of engaging in a given partnership at the time of the decision.
Transparency Must Be a Cornerstone of Regulation
PPPs are by nature incomplete contracts, and in the volatile environment of developing countries, it is natural that they be adjusted over time to changing conditions. However, the issue of contract renegotiation has been
controversial. In many cases, it has been conducted behind closed doors, without transparency. In a comprehensive study on renegotiation of infra- structure PPPs in Latin America, Guasch (2004) found that a high propor- tion of water PPPs ended up being renegotiated shortly after the start of the contract.67 All this activity fueled criticism that private operators could have been taking advantage ofcontractual adjustments to make financial gains, and it has undermined the credibility of the PPP approach as a valid option to improve the performance of urban water utilities in several countries.
Progress is clearly needed in this area. It is essential that the ongoing supervision and regulation of a PPP contract be carried out in a structured and fully transparent manner. All PPP contracts should be made available for public scrutiny as a standard policy. Performance monitoring and report- ing of obligations must be strictly enforced and the results made available to the public as a matter of routine. Governments also have an obligation to communicate to the public the rationale and justifications behind each regulatory decision. This is especially important for all that is related to tar- iff adjustments (even when based on existing contractual clauses) or other modifications that may affect the financial equilibrium of a PPP. Contractual adjustments are probably unavoidable in the volatile environment of devel- oping countries, but they cannot be expected to be accepted by the popula- tion and other stakeholders unless conducted in full transparency. This is an area where the involvement of international financial institutions during the implementation phase can be of much value, especially in countries with weak governance and institutional capacity.
Incorporation of Social Goals
Social issues have been controversial in many water PPPs. It is clear that more needs to be done to ensure that more PPP projects benefit the poor. To do this, designers of PPP projects must explicitly recognize and factor in the costs of social goals as well as consider the options of subsidizing the poor and unlinking customer tariffs from the remuneration of the private operator. Also, the wide-ranging impacts of PPPs on the workforce deserve further study in order to be better addressed.
- For the period 1985–2000, the study found that renegotiation in the water sector had occurred in 74 percent of cases, a much higher incidence than in other infrastructure sectors. Guasch also found that renegotiation had occurred sooner than in other sectors, taking place on average just 1.6 years after the award of the contract, and was (in most cases) instigated by the private operator. It must be noted that this study used widely defined criteria for renegotia- tion, and its sample included contractual arrangements that are not considered in the present study, including build, operate, and transfer (BOTs) and similar arrangements for new treatment plants.
(Dec. 2015)